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Abstract 
In his “Argumentation Ethics and the Question of Self-Ownership” 
(2015), Andrew T. Young claims that, next to Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s 
ethics of self-ownership, a subclass of systems based on every person 
owning part of every person also meets the criteria of being validated by 
the ethics of argumentation and is consistent with the requirements that 
an ethical system should qualify as a categorical imperative and allow for the 
physical survival of humanity. I argue that Young fails to understand 
argumentation ethics and that his alternative ethics cannot be considered 
categorically imperative; it is likely to stimulate rather than diminish political 
conflicts. 
______________________________________________________ 
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The title of Andrew Young’s paper, “Argumentation Ethics and the 
Question of Self-Ownership,” suggests that it is about argumentation 
ethics (also known as the argument from argumentation or the 
argument from reason). However, although Young’s paper mentions 
argumentation ethics, it does not in any way depend on it and offers 
no analytically relevant criticism of it. He merely dismisses it as “a 
gotcha! tactic,” noting, “As an economist, I find these tactics to be 
unproductive and distracting” (which, I am sure he will agree, is no 
more than an unproductive and distracting aside). 
The objective of argumentation ethics is to determine which 
propositions—in particular, which normative propositions—are 
undeniable in any argumentation. This goes beyond identifying well-
proven facts and formal or semantic contradictions, because an 
argumentation is an exchange of arguments, questions, and answers 
between at least two speakers who must follow certain rules and 
standards in asking and replying to questions in order to defend or 
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prove their own positions as well as to challenge or refute their 
opponent’s positions. By and large, argumentation ethics assumes the 
rules and standards that define due process in a judicial trial, but it is 
concerned with all kinds of argumentations, not only with litigation in 
a court of law. The operative idea of argumentation ethics is that a 
speaker cannot, in reason, be allowed to challenge rules or facts on 
which he himself relies while objecting to his opponent’s use of the 
same. In particular, a speaker should not be allowed to deny the 
obvious: for example, that he is making assertions, raising questions, 
and engaging the other speaker in an argument. Thus, apart from 
formal and semantic contradictions, argumentation ethics also 
identifies pragmatic, performative, or dialectical contradictions in a 
speaker’s attitude and takes note of his dishonesty with respect to the 
ongoing argumentation itself (e.g., when he says or asks something 
and later denies having said or asked it). 
The following elements of argumentation ethics are directly 
relevant to Young’s paper: (1) a person’s self-control is a necessary 
condition of his ability to engage others in argumentation; (2) 
exercising self-control with proper respect for others is a person’s 
undeniable (i.e., argumentatively undeniable) right of self-ownership. If 
“libertarianism” is defined as the requirement that all persons’ 
undeniable rights (their self-ownership in the first place) be respected, 
it follows that (3) any argumentatively defensible ethical system must 
be libertarian. 
Young associates the third claim almost exclusively with the work 
of Hans-Hermann Hoppe.1 Young rejects Hoppe’s claim but does 
not argue against his defense of it. Instead, he merely presents, as a 
counterexample, an alternative ethical system that, in his opinion, is 
argumentatively validated but does not imply self-ownership (and is 
therefore not libertarian). If the counterexample were pertinent, it 
would refute Hoppe’s claim. However, it is not pertinent, as I will 
show. 
Young proposes to “generalize” from Hoppe’s determinate 
concept (hereafter H) of a person’s undeniable rights being based on 
100 percent self-ownership (and 0 percent other-ownership) to the 
indeterminate concept of a person’s rights being based on n percent 
self-ownership and (100 – n) percent other-ownership. The point at 
                                                            
1 Hoppe was not the first to note that argumentation ethics can serve to justify the 
core principles of the Western tradition of law: personal freedom, private property, 
contract, and personal accountability to be assessed in a public process of free and 
informed argumentation. See F. van Dun (1983). 
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issue is not whether for some value 0 ≤ n ≤ 100, the generalized 
concept (hereafter G) is formally inconsistent. Rather, it is Young’s 
claim to have discovered a specification of G that is both 
nonlibertarian and undeniable, so that respecting it is a “categorical 
imperative,” binding in all conceivable circumstances on all potential 
arguers (i.e., on all persons—assuming that the ability to reason or 
argue is a mark of personhood). It is not obvious how respecting or 
abiding by an indeterminate concept can be a categorical imperative, 
but before we subject Young’s assertions to critical scrutiny, a brief 
explanation of self-ownership is in order. 
 
II. Self-Control, Self-Ownership, and Argumentation 
Each of us has direct control over parts of our body, and no one has 
direct control over any part of another’s body. Some bodily 
movements (e.g., sneezes, spasms) merely happen to a person; other 
movements happen because he makes them happen (e.g., he lifts his 
paralyzed left hand with his right hand); but there are also 
movements that he simply and willfully performs without first having 
to do something else (e.g., he raises his hand to greet or to draw the 
attention of another person). Similarly, each of us has direct control 
over parts of our mind, and no one has direct control over any part 
of another’s mind. Some thoughts (dreams, hallucinations, and 
passing thoughts) merely happen to a person even when he is not 
thinking, but other thoughts require him to focus his mind, which he 
can do simply and willfully without first having to do something else. 
A person’s powers of self-control wax and wane in the process of 
growing up and then growing old, but most people can and do 
extend and refine some of them considerably by training and 
exercise. They manifest themselves in movements of his body and 
mind that he can and does perform at will. 
Although it may be possible for a person to override another’s 
powers of self-control, he cannot make the other do or think 
something simply by willing him to do it. He needs to apply physical 
force in the form of drugs, mechanical or electromagnetic equipment, 
or other, less scientifically sophisticated means of distraction or 
torture to weaken or disable the other’s powers of self-control. 
In the context of argumentation, self-control is an undeniable 
fact, at least as far as the arguers are concerned. It is the ability to 
think for oneself about questions to ask and answers to give, and it is 
the ability to speak for oneself in making assertions, asking questions, 
answering questions, and evaluating answers. Assuming one 
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understands the distinction between participating in argumentation 
and pretending to do so or being forced to mouth or write down 
certain words, one cannot conceive of a case of argumentation in 
which an arguer lacks the self-controlled capabilities that distinguish a 
human natural person from a nonperson (e.g., a cat or a wardrobe) or 
an artificial person (e.g., a robot or corporation—one cannot argue 
with a robot, although one can argue with its manufacturers or 
programmers, and one cannot argue with a corporation, but one can 
argue with the people that own, manage, or represent it). 
Argumentation is a distinctly human form of interaction and 
communication. 
The move from the fact of self-control to the right of self-
ownership requires argumentation but is not problematic for humans. 
The simplest cases of argumentation involve only two persons, each 
of them referring to himself as “I” and to the other as “you.” 
Concerning the distribution of ownership-in-persons between those 
two, there are several logically possible outcomes or conclusions of 
their argumentations: (a) each of us owns himself and only himself; 
(b) each of us owns the other but not himself; (c) each of us owns 
both himself and the other; (d) each of us owns parts of both of us; 
(e) one of us owns both himself and the other; (f) neither of us owns 
any part of either of us; and so on. Here, “X owns Y” is short for “X 
has the right to speak for Y, and Y has no right to say or ask anything 
without X’s permission.” Notice, however, that while there are 
several logically possible outcomes of their argumentation, only (a) is 
an undeniable starting position. It and it alone makes it possible for 
the two persons to engage one another in an argumentation (in 
particular, an argumentation concerning the distribution of 
ownership rights in their persons). All the other positions make it 
impossible for them to even begin arguing with one another, for each 
of those positions requires a prior argument to answer one of the 
following questions: “Which one of us owns the other?” “Which part 
of me do you own, and which part of you do I own?” “What is my 
contribution to our discussion if nothing I can say or ask counts 
unless you validate it by declaring it to be really something you say or 
ask?” and so on. 
In any argumentation, it is undeniable that “I” and “you” are 
persons, that “we” (the arguers) ought to respect one another as free 
and equal persons relative to one another, and that “we” ought to 
settle “our” differences by argumentation or argumentatively 
defensible methods. Moreover, “All arguers are persons and all 
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persons are capable of (though not necessarily skillful at) engaging 
others in argumentation” is analytically true. Hence, it is also 
undeniable that persons ought to settle their differences by 
argumentation or by argumentatively defensible methods. The reason 
is that a speaker’s argumentative defense of a negation of this 
“ought” (e.g., “We may or ought to use argumentatively indefensible 
methods to settle our differences”) entails his admission that, even if 
his arguments are successful, they are no more conclusive than, say, 
waterboarding one’s opponent as a method for getting him to 
acknowledge the right way to resolve disagreements or conflicts. He 
is trapped in a pragmatic, performative, or dialectical contradiction—
as if he were saying, “My argument, which I want you to take 
seriously, is that you should not take my argument seriously, because 
it is irrelevant.” 
Furthermore, it is undeniable that persons ought to respect one 
another as free and equal persons relative to one another. This “free 
and equal” condition implies noninterference with the other’s powers 
of self-control. Thus, it is undeniable that persons ought to respect 
each other’s self-ownership. The libertarian nonaggression principle 
is but one implication of the undeniable categorical imperative that 
proper ways to resolve disputes ought to be determined by 
argumentation or argumentatively validated methods among the 
parties to a dispute. 
Due process implies that that one cannot claim the right to affirm 
that it is wrong for others and right for oneself to use or to threaten 
violence against a self-owner. Hence, it also implies that it is 
categorically wrong to use or to threaten violence against a self-
owner. Other implications are that every person must be presumed 
innocent of aggression, fraud, or any other undeniable wrong until 
proven guilty. Thus, in the absence of conclusive evidence of their 
wrongdoing, people are to be considered self-owners—as it were “by 
default.”2 Obviously, outside the context of argumentation, self-
ownership (in the sense of Hoppe’s H) is to be construed only as a 
presumptive right and not as an absolute right. For example, an 
aggressor cannot, in reason, argue that defensive or retaliatory uses of 
violence against his person or property are unethical (unlawful, 
illegitimate) on the grounds that they violate his self-ownership: “It is 
wrong for you to disregard my self-ownership, but it was right for me 
                                                            
2 See my papers on argumentation quoted by Andy Young, van Dun (2006; 2009), 
and van Dun (1983). 
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to disregard yours.” Still, he must be presumed a self-owner as long 
as there is no proof that he was indeed the aggressor: that question, 
too, ought to be settled argumentatively, just as the question “What 
constitutes proof in cases of this kind?” deserves a well-argued 
answer. “We both argumentatively presume each other’s innocence 
or honesty” puts no obstacle in the way of further argumentation, 
whereas “I presume your guilt or dishonesty” makes further 
argumentation impossible: “Everything you say will be presumed a lie 
or a cover-up of your crime—so do not think that you can prove 
your honesty or your innocence, for your alleged proof will also be 
treated as a lie or as part of a cover-up. In short: you are at my mercy, 
so prepare yourself to be thankful for any mercy you might receive 
from me.” 
 
III. Force or Reason? 
Rights are metaphysical things; they do not exert physical force and 
are not changed by physical forces. Some people prefer to live like 
beasts and determine never to let a nonphysical thing stand in their 
way. They do not care about argumentation and would rather take or 
destroy what they want by whatever means or methods available to 
them, without being deterred by the fact that they may not have a 
right to do so. They have nothing to contribute when it comes to 
answering the question, “Which things, states of affairs, or actions 
can be rationally justified in an argumentation?” As it happens, 
however, that question is precisely the one that Young proposes to 
answer—and proposes to answer argumentatively. After all, he has 
taken the trouble to devote an academic paper to it and expressed his 
thanks to many people with whom he had previously discussed his 
views, presumably in respectful argumentations. 
Unfortunately, his argumentation consists of little more than a 
number of assertions, which I paraphrase as follows: “Hoppe says 
that each person owns himself and only himself; I say that each 
person owns a part of every person”; “Hoppe’s scheme is an 
undeniable Kantian categorical imperative, and so is mine.” However, 
whether or not it is a categorical imperative, Young’s scheme is 
certainly not undeniable. Indeed, what would count as proof for the 
claim, “I, Andy Young, own a part of you, Hans Hoppe”? A thief 
may have acquired control over part of his victim’s property (e.g., his 
car). In that case, we say that the victim owns part of the thief’s 
possessions—for theft does not change ownership—if the victim can 
prove that the car was his property and that the thief stole it. 
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Assuredly, we can imagine a situation in which Hoppe had stolen or 
otherwise gained control of part of Young’s body or mind in a 
nonargumentative way. However, Young does not even try to make 
the case that Hoppe did such a thing. In fact, he offers no argument 
at all for his claim to be the owner of part of Hoppe (or anybody 
else). Apparently, he assumes that ownership questions cannot or 
should not be decided argumentatively. Are they, then, purely matters 
of stealth or force? 
Kantian categorical imperatives should not be confused with 
undeniable ought statements. To be sure, some undeniable ought 
statements happen to be also Kantian categorical imperatives, but 
that is not what makes them undeniable. For example, “Every person 
should have the same name” might qualify as a Kantian categorical 
imperative—because one can act according to it and can “at the same 
time, will that it should become a universal law”3—but it is certainly 
not undeniable. Kantian categorical imperatives are notoriously 
inadequate foundations for ethical thought. At the very least, Kant’s 
often-quoted formula is ambiguous: “can” can mean many things. 
Only if “can will” means something else than “can want” or “can 
desire” can we begin to make sense of the quoted version of the 
Kantian imperative. Of course, “the will” is a metaphysical concept, 
unlike “a want” or “a desire,” and I know many economists who find 
metaphysical concepts “unproductive and distracting.” But it was 
Young, a confessed economist, who appealed to Kant in defense of 
his claims, so he will perhaps forgive me for making these comments. 
 
IV. Young’s “Nonlibertarian Ethics” 
We note that neither the libertarian nonaggression principle nor the 
ethics of argumentation precludes any group of persons from 
committing themselves, by their free and informed consent, to live 
and work together according to the requirements of a particular 
ownership scheme that deviates from libertarian self-ownership. Full-
fledged communism may be a foolish idea, but self-owners have a 
right to enter into an agreement with consenting others to try it out. 
Less than full-fledged communism was in fact the historical norm of 
human association (e.g., in traditional communities), but it did not 
often go so far as to repudiate self-ownership. Members, especially 
young adults, usually had exit rights, the right to leave at will, to free 
                                                            
3 This is quoted by Young from Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 
translated by M. J. Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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themselves from onerous community obligations at the price of 
losing standing, influence, or connections within the community, and 
so on. However, some communities did turn into prisons, did reduce 
parts of their population to the status of slaves or human resources at 
the beck and call of the community leaders. Their problem is not that 
they are necessarily doomed to be short-lived, but that their 
constitution cannot be rationally justified against all potential arguers 
(i.e., persons, who are capable of rational self-control). Whether their 
leaders or the majority of their members like to admit it or not, their 
constitution is a lie, because it denies an undeniable fact. 
If Young were merely proposing a scheme for the establishment 
of a new voluntary society or community, a libertarian would shrug 
his shoulders and say, “Go ahead, try it—but don’t pretend that your 
agreement with consenting others gives you the right to impose your 
scheme on nonconsenting others.” However, his claim is not so 
modest. He claims to have discovered a nonlibertarian scheme of 
ownership-of-persons that can be justified categorically—not only 
contingently within a particular group of like-minded people 
sympathetic to the same idea, but argumentatively against the 
objections of every person. If that is not his claim, one can only 
wonder why he lards his paper with references to argumentation 
ethics and to Hoppe’s defense of 100 percent self-ownership. 
Let us consider Young’s scheme—he calls it a scenario—which 
he labels D: “Each man will be partially and equally owned by 
everyone else, while maintaining a controlling share of self-
ownership.” Young clarifies his meaning of the term “controlling 
share of self-ownership” as follows: “A man’s own will to act 
overrides any other individual’s share [of ownership in himself] taken 
alone” and “could only be overridden by a coalition of two or more 
equal other-owners of noncontrolling shares.” Specifically, a 
controlling share is not the only share: if it were, then D would be 
equivalent to Hoppe’s 100 percent self-ownership. It is also not a 
majority of shares, which would mean that a man owns more than 50 
percent of the shares in his person and so is able to overrule any 
coalition of other shareholders. 
D is obviously a specification of G defined by three additional 
conditions: 
(1) A person’s percentage share σ in his self must satisfy σ < 50 
and σ > 100(1 / P), where P is the total number of persons in the 
population;  
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(2) Every other person owns (100 – σ) /  (P – 1) percent of that 
person; and 
(3) σ < n(100 – σ) / (P – 1), where n is the least number of people 
required to make a self-ownership overriding coalition of 
noncontrolling shares. 
It should be clear that, in proposing D, Young takes 
unannounced leave of argumentation and its ethics, even though 
these are the ostensible presuppositions of his paper. Typically, 
argumentation takes place between two people; it only becomes more 
complex when several two-person argumentations interlock: in their 
discussion of some problem, A and B refer to arguments used or 
conclusions reached in their discussions with others or in discussions 
in which neither of them took part. The two-person I-versus-you case 
is the paradigm of argumentation. However, what does D mean in 
that case? Let’s see. 
(1) A’s percentage share σ in himself must satisfy the impossible 
condition σ < 50 and σ > 50 (σ > 1001 / P, with P = 2); 
(2) Every other person, i.e., B, owns (100 – σ) / (P – 1), i.e., 100 –
 σ percent of A; and  
(3) σ < n(100 – σ). 
Young’s problem is to find a value for n that satisfies D but 
falsifies full self-ownership (H). Unfortunately for him, only three 
values are available in a two-person setting: 0, 1, and 2. The first 
(n = 0) is impossible because it reduces condition (3) to σ < 0, that is, 
a negative percentage share. The second (n = 1) and the third (n = 2) 
reduce that condition to σ < (100 – σ), respectively σ < 2(100 – σ), 
that is, to B’s share in A being larger than A’s share—which violates 
the condition that A should have a controlling share in himself. In 
short, D cannot apply to the two-person case. Therefore, regardless 
of its argumentative deniability, D cannot even be a categorical 
imperative, if it is understood that a categorical imperative is a maxim 
that one can want to be a “universal law” for populations of any size 
(including the cases “I alone” and “only you and I”). 
If we take Young’s “two or more override one” condition 
seriously, then n = 2. Consequently, if P = 4 then σ must be larger 
than 25 percent and smaller than 50 percent [2/3 of (100 – σ)]. If 
P = 100 then σ must be larger than 1 percent and smaller than 1.98 
percent [2/99 of (100 – σ)]. However, should we take n = 2 seriously? 
A previous version of Young’s paper had a final section (now deleted 
together with many others) in which he asked whether 26 individuals 
out of 101 can “ethically aggress” against a single person, and 
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answered in the affirmative. Why n = 26? Because he began with the 
arbitrary assumption that a controlling share equals 20 percent—and 
if P = 101, then 26 is the smallest number of opponents whose 
combined shares in an individual outweigh his one controlling 20 
percent share. The value of n depends on a “given” value of σ. 
Recalculating the example with n = 2 (instead of 26), we find that a 
controlling share cannot be more than 1.9605 percent. The value of σ 
depends on a “given” value of n. So, which is the independent value, 
n or σ? If σ = 50, then n must be 101, which is a coalition that 
includes the individual himself: P = 101. Of course, on the Hoppean 
σ = 100, no coalition can lawfully override any individual’s self-
ownership. 
So, Young leaves us with an intractable problem: How and where 
should the D people find the numbers that will condition their lawful 
relations? Why should they agree on any number defining the size of 
either a “controlling share” or a “minimal overriding coalition”? 
The author tells us, rightly, “D does not necessarily imply a 
libertarian ethic.” He also tells us that compliance with D is a 
categorical imperative on the grounds that it (1) passes a 
universalization test, and (2) permits action and the survival of 
mankind. Surely, there are lots of rules that satisfy those conditions 
but are nevertheless not undeniable: mankind is a tough species; the 
madness it can’t survive has not yet been tried. What guarantee is 
there that any two such “categorical” rules are mutually compatible? 
A scheme that leaves us with conflicting categorical imperatives 
leaves us with no undeniable categorical imperative at all—it sets us 
adrift in the armchair logician’s universe of “logically possible 
worlds.” So, it remains a mystery why anyone should consider D a 
categorical imperative for this world. Could it be that Young confuses 
the ethics of argumentation with contractarianism? Is every “social 
contract” a categorical imperative? No, it is not: for a contract to be 
categorically imperative it would have to be such that all persons 
ought to accept it, regardless of their wanting to be bound by it. Why 
should any person accept any particular value for n (other than P, 
which at present exceeds seven billion people) or σ (other than 100)? 
 
V. Ethics as a Justification of the Status Quo? 
It is doubtful that the author’s scheme does not significantly impede 
human action. For small populations of more than two but, say, 
fewer than 250 people, D may work. However, as the size of the 
population increases, the number of potential coalitions increases 
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exponentially. If n = 2 is maintained, then the concept of a 
controlling share rapidly loses significance. D ends up being 
practically indistinguishable from “each person owns an equal share 
in every person,” which the author explicitly characterizes as 
precluding action. If, however, σ (the size of the “controlling share”) 
is fixed at a value below 50 percent, then the minimum size of a 
lawful opposing coalition (and therefore the cost of organizing it) 
increases as the population grows larger. At some point, there is no 
longer a practically significant difference between D and full self-
ownership. 
It is not clear whether D comes with a presumption in favor of 
majority tyranny (“an individual person should prove that there is no 
coalition against his undertaking a particular action that is larger than 
any coalition willing to let him do so”) or a presumption in favor of 
individual liberty (“an opponent of an individual’s action should 
prove that those against it control more shares than those in favor”). 
Nor is it clear whether those who express no opinion on the 
permissibility of an action should be presumed to side with its 
opponents or not. We are not told how and where either party 
should present its claim that it has the majority of shares in an 
individual. Nor are we told about the legal liability of the members of 
either party: Are they to be held accountable and liable for the 
consequences of an individual’s actions that they permitted, or for 
the consequences of an individual’s abstaining from action in 
compliance with their demands? 
What happens to someone who acts before a vote is taken? 
According to Young, an individual “always has . . . first-mover 
status,” because “a contrary coalition is costly in terms of time, effort, 
and information gathering.” However, D does not guarantee 
immunity for opportunistically exploiting the costliness of forming an 
opposing coalition by an unanticipated first move. Nor should it do 
so: an aggressor has first-mover status, because he can choose his 
targets as well as the time and place of his attacks and because 
organizing a defensive coalition is a costly affair. Surely, we do not 
want immunity for all aggressors. 
In any case, under D, all practical questions concerning an 
individual’s life and work are to be resolved ideally and ultimately by 
counting noses, not by argumentation. Needless to say, counting 
noses is not the proper way to identify categorical imperatives or to 
resolve disputed questions generally—including questions about the 
proper way to resolve a particular dispute. “A majority has the right 
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(ought to be permitted) to use violence against a minority” is not an 
undeniable normative truth. 
Young gives his game away when he warns us—albeit in a 
footnote—that we should not lose sight of “the analogy [of D] to 
ownership in a corporation.” Supposedly, that analogy “effectively 
indicates that exclusive control is not presumed in justifying actions 
and statements rationally.” This is wrong. By making an argument in 
the general assembly of a corporation, a person does demonstrate 
exclusive self-control, even if he does not thereby demonstrate 
exclusive ownership of his status as a shareholder of the corporation. 
That status is determined in the corporation’s statutes. A “corporate 
decision” (legally valid under the corporation’s statutes) can change 
his status as a shareholder of the corporation but not the fact that he 
is a natural person, capable of self-control and argumentation. 
Young asks us to consider the case of a shareholder who owns 
only one out of a total of n corporate shares and makes a proposal in 
the general assembly. Then he tells us that this “does not in any way 
belie the fact that [the proposal] is indeed an argument,” even though 
its “weight” is only 1 / n. From the point of view of the ethics of 
argumentation, this is irrelevant. It is true that in the general 
assembly, only the number of votes counts in weighing the proposal, 
but in an argumentation, its weight depends on whether it can be 
defended satisfactorily against counterarguments, and ultimately, on 
whether it ought to be accepted by all rational persons. 
So, what is the point of the corporate analogy? It is to be found 
in the fact that D implies that every person be considered as if he 
were a corporation (pi) the shares of which are held by every person: all 
natural persons are shareholders and therefore members of the 
general assembly of every pi. Now, seriously, how many general 
assemblies can a natural person attend in his lifetime? Arguably, apart 
from the holder of the “controlling share” and a few of his friends 
and personal enemies, the most likely attendees in any assembly will 
be chronic meddlers, who [under D] are also likely to be the majority 
of those present to vote. If so, would those meddlers (as politicians 
and would-be politicians) not find it efficient to merge all those pi 
into a single corporation W (“The World, Inc.”), even if it meant that 
every pi (and therefore, every person) is fully and legally owned by W, 
under the statutes and regulations of W drawn up and approved by 
those very same inveterate meddlers? Moreover, since Young 
assumes that D is a categorical imperative, any statute drawn up in 
conformity with D would be “ethical,” no matter how arbitrary, 
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foolish, coercive, or evil it may be: “[coalition-based coercion] opens 
the door for the possibility of ethical government.”4 Noting these 
consequences, we may admit that, even though Young’s scenario D is 
not argumentatively justifiable, it is a good approximation of the 
actual ways of thinking of most politicians in the present world. As 
an economist, he may find that a compliment. It concedes the 
“empirical relevancy” of his scenario. 
At this point, the connection—if there ever was one—between 
argumentation ethics and the author’s generalized concept of 
ownership-of-persons (G) and his scenario D is irretrievably lost. The 
ethics of argumentation applies only to natural persons: they are the 
only sort of persons who can engage one another in argumentation. 
It does not apply to artificial persons, because these are only tools of 
natural persons. What those natural persons, when acting as 
representatives of a corporation, are entitled to say or question 
depends entirely on the statutory and regulatory conventions of that 
corporation. It does not depend on the purpose and methods of 
argumentation, which are defined by undeniable normative 
principles. A human person participating in argumentation need not 
be “represented.” He is a natural being capable of self-presentation, 




Andrew Young does not show much understanding of the purpose 
and method of the uniquely human practice of argumentation. Not 
only does he fail to make a dent in the cases for full self-ownership 
and libertarian ethics, he does not even try. Instead, he presents one 
more arbitrary scheme for allocating ownership of persons and 
asserts, without argumentation, that to argue for it does not involve 
him in a performative self-contradiction—even though his scheme 
cannot apply to the standard case of person-to-person argumentation 
and offers no strategy for argumentatively resolving the 
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4 This statement is from the previous version of Young’s paper. 
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